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Abstract 
An issue that has not yet been explored in the field of strategic human resource 
management (SHRM) is that of managing the ‘risks’ involved in human capital management of 
the firm. We address this issue using the real option theory framework. We argue that certain 
HR practices manage risk and generate opportunities for the firm by creating ‘options’ for its 
human capital management. These HR options help ensure stability of returns from human 
capital and thus sustain competitive advantage. Different types of HR options and the role of 
certain HR practices in creation of these options are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  Over the past 10 years, significant research attention has been devoted to empirically 
examine the relationship between HR practices and firm performance.  Numerous studies have 
established the positive linkage between high performance HR practices and superior firm 
performance (Arthur, 1994; Delery & Doty, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Youndt, Snell, Dean, & Lepak, 
1996). This linkage has been empirically validated in studies replicated in several countries 
(Guthrie, 2000; Harel & Tzafrir, 1999; Kim, 1999; Wood, 1998).  
Researchers now call for examining how these HR practices translate into greater firm 
performance (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Becker & Huselid, 1998; Delery, 1998; Wright & 
Sherman, 1999). Becker and Huselid (1998) suggest two primary processes through which this 
impact takes place.  First the “…HRM-firm performance relationship could be largely driven by a 
more efficient management of a firm’s HR, and the consequent contribution to lower operating 
costs…” (p 56).  This translates to HR practices being a set “cost reducing” techniques.    
The second means through which HR practices can impact firm performance is through 
the notion of HRM as a strategic asset.  Grounded in the resource-based theory, Becker and 
Huselid (1998) argue that interrelated systems of HR practices are inimitable and can provide a 
strategic lever for the firm. These systems are the basis for the “…acquisition, motivation, and 
development of the intellectual assets that can be a source of competitive advantage.” (p. 55)   
More focus among academics has been on this latter process where HR practices are 
hypothesized to impact the intellectual capital (or human capital), which is viewed as one of a 
firm’s most strategic assets (Snell, Youndt, & Wright, 1996; Wright, McMahan & McWilliams, 
1994).  This focus on HR practices as impacting the asset of human capital shifts the focus to 
HR as having a strategic role, rather than simply being viewed as a “cost center” (Becker & 
Huselid, 1998).  However, this treatment of the human capital as an asset has universally 
focused only on the upside value inherent in an asset.  If one accepts the argument that human 
capital should be treated as an asset, then one necessarily must recognize that any asset 
entails risk and part of the strategic management of a firm requires managing that risk.  The 
issue of managing the risk of human assets has been unexplored in the Strategic HRM 
literature.   
This paper is an attempt to address this gap in the literature. We argue that like all other 
investments in real assets, human capital investments also carry the risk of loss of value. The 
risk may take several forms like depreciation or obsolescence of skills and abilities, employee 
turnover, non-conforming behavior, requirement of skills different than those possessed by the 
current employees, need to cut down the numbers and so on.  Managers need to manage these 
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risks in order to stabilize returns from the firm’s human capital. Thus, this issue should be 
examined within the framework of the Strategic HRM literature.  We suggest that in addition to 
direct reduction of operating costs or the creation of intangible assets that generate revenues, 
HR practices can also play an important role in the management of risk associated with 
investments in human capital.  
One important risk-management framework that is being applied in the strategic 
management field is the real options theory (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, 
McGrath, 1997, 1999), which claims that real options formed on real assets will minimize risks 
of loss of value and maximize future opportunities for investments in these assets. Real options 
are contracts written on real assets that give the owner time-deferred choices regarding future 
investments in these assets. This way real options stabilize returns from the real assets. This 
paper uses this framework to analyze risks and opportunities in SHRM and how HR practices as 
bundles of options may contribute in managing these risks and opportunities, thereby creating 
value for the firm. 
 The paper is organized in two sections: the first section discusses real options theory (as 
distinct from financial options theory) and its main assertions; the second section discusses the 
application of real options theory in SHRM, the different HR options, and their role in managing 
risks and maximizing returns from human capital.  
 
REAL OPTIONS THEORY  
Financial Options 
In financial markets, options are contracts written on financial assets (stocks, 
commodities, foreign currency) in order to manage risks of depreciation of value, or to avail of 
the benefits of future appreciation of value. ‘Calls’ (options to buy) are contracts that give the 
owner the right, but not the obligation, to buy the underlying asset at a predetermined strike 
price within a future expiration date. ‘Puts’ (option to sell) give the owner the right, but not the 
obligation, to sell the underlying asset at a strike price within the expiration date. Financial 
investment managers often maintain a combination of these two types of contracts in order to 
minimize risks and maximize opportunities for returns from financial investments. 
Options are created due to uncertainties about the returns from investments. The greater 
the volatility of the underlying asset price/returns, the higher is the uncertainty. The seller of the 
call options, who owns the asset, wants to buffer against the risk of loss in his investments and 
to guarantee a return for the asset, through the strike price. The buyer of the call option wants to 
keep the investment opportunities open for that asset without sinking in the whole amount in the 
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current period. If the market price of the stock remains below the strike price, the holder will not 
exercise the option. So the seller of the option retains the stock and keeps the premium as 
profit, while the buyer only loses the premium. If the market price rises above the strike price, 
the option will be exercised. The holder will buy the stocks and sell them at the market price, 
thereby making profit. The seller also makes profit, but loses the opportunity of greater profits.  
Put options work exactly the opposite way. The buyer of a put option expects the market 
price of the stock to go below the strike price so that he/she can buy the stock from the market 
at a lower price at a future date and sell it at the strike price with profits. The seller on the other 
hand expects the market prices to go up, so that the option is not exercised and he/she retains 
the premium as profit. Consequently, if the market price goes above the strike price, the put 
option will not be exercised.  
Real Options  
Real options theory scholars seek to understand decisions regarding investments in real 
options that are similar to financial options in structure but for which the assumptions made in 
valuing financial options do not hold (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). The 
primary assertion of this theory is that real options create alternative choices for decisions 
regarding investments in real assets.  These choices are time deferred so the organization is 
able to base its decisions on actual circumstances that may occur in the future, rather than on 
the expectation (or inaccurate approximation) of the future. Since the future is uncertain, these 
deferred choices greatly reduce the risk that investments will lose their entire value or will 
become worthless. Real options give the owner the rights to real assets without making the full 
investment at the present time period, and to keep the opportunities for future investments 
open. The real options theory has been applied to the decision-making process for investments 
in real assets like new technology, new collaborations, new venture creation, new projects etc. 
(Hurry, Miller, & Bowman, 1992; Kogut, 1991; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; Kulatilaka & Marcus, 
1988). 
Real options are created on real assets. Real assets are similar to financial assets 
because they generate returns, are valuable, require capital investment, carry the risk of 
depreciation of value, and the opportunity of appreciation of value. The dissimilarity between 
real assets and financial assets lies in the fact that real assets may have ‘intangible’ or ‘invisible’ 
(Itami, 1987) components that may not be easily valued. For example it is difficult to put a value 
on a firm’s reputation, brand image, knowledge base etc. Thus it is difficult to arrive at a full 
valuation of real assets.    
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 Unlike financial options, real options are not precisely defined or neatly packaged 
(Amram & Kulatuilaka, 1999). There are other dissimilarities between real and financial options 
as well. First, financial options are almost perfectly tradable because efficient financial markets 
exist for them. Real options are not perfectly tradable because market imperfections and 
asymmetries are present in their markets. Second, the exact valuation of real options may not 
be possible even with passage of time. This is because of the ‘invisible’ components of the real 
assets, which makes valuation of real options extremely difficult. Third, financial options have 
specific maturity dates, whereas real options typically involve unknown or uncertain expiration 
dates. Fourth, financial options are explicitly written contracts, while real options exist implicitly 
in the resources, capabilities, and processes of the firm, and may not be written. For this reason 
Sanchez (1993) prefers to denote these as ‘shadow’ options. The basic underlying principle of 
real options nevertheless remain the same as financial options i.e. risk minimization and 
opportunity maximization.    
Types of Real Options 
A wide variety of real options have been discussed by scholars in various fields of study. 
These are: option to defer investments (Ingersoll & Ross, 1992; McDonald & Segel, 1986), 
options for staging investments (Majd & Pindyck, 1987; Trigeorgis, 1993b), options to alter 
operating scale (Pindyck, 1988; Trigeorgis & Mason, 1987), option to abandon (Myers & Majd, 
1990), option to switch (Kulatilaka, 1993; Kulatilaka & Trigeorgis, 1994), options to grow (Kester, 
1984, 1993; Myers, 1977; Pindyck, 1988), flexibility options (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999; 
Bowman & Hurry, 1993), learning options (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999), and multiple interacting 
options (Kulatilaka, 1998; Trigeoris, 1993a). Table 1 summarizes the different kinds of real 
options discussed in the literature. 
We shall discuss real options according to the functions they serve (Sanchez, 1993).  
Timing options create choices for the time of investment. Options to defer investments, options 
for staging investments, growth options, and learning options fall in this category. Options to 
defer investments reduce risks by allowing for a delay in investments till the value of the 
investment becomes more apparent. For example when an oil company takes a lease for drilling 
sites rather than outright purchase, it is deferring the investment decision till the end of the lease 
period. At the end of this period it still has the option to purchase the site. This keeps the 
opportunities open, in case oil is struck at the site. Options for staging investment entails a 
series of investment outlays rather than a single outlay upfront. This creates the option to 
‘default’ at any given stage, thereby limiting the risk of non-performance of the asset. This option 
is valuable in all R&D-intensive industries, especially pharmaceuticals, and in highly uncertain, 
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long-development capital-intensive industries, such as energy-generating plants or large-scale 
construction (real or commercial estates). Growth options i.e. investments that create growth 
opportunities, are created because the future of these investments is uncertain. By buying the 
initial options (e.g. a patent, or by investing partially in a new venture), the firm gains access to 
the potential upside while limiting the losses they would incur from unfavorable outcomes. 
Similarly, learning options are limited investments made to test the market. 
 
Table 1: Different Types of Real Options 
Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999 Bowman & Hurry, 1993 Sanchez, 1993 Trigeorgis, 1996 
Timing options (delay 
investments)  
Incremental options (choice for 
further investment or 
abandonment) 
Timing options Option to defer (hold a lease till 
prices justify full investment)  
Growth options (investment 
creates growth opportunities) 
Flexibility options (choice to 
switch) 
Product options (which products 
may be developed, produced 
and marketed) 
Staged investment option (series 
of outlays, option to abandon 
and minimize loss) 
Staging Options (invest in 
stages rather than all at once) 
 Implementation options (how to 
choose among alternative 
resources and capabilities)  
Option to alter operating scale 
(to expand, to contract, to shut 
down and restart)  
Exit options (reduces the size of 
the investment at risk)  
  Option to switch (change output 
mix or input mix) 
Flexibility options (the option to 
shift production, input, output in 
response to shift in demands or 
costs) 
  Growth options (early 
investment e.g. acquisition, 
projects etc. to open up future 
opportunities)  
Operating options (expand, 
contract scale of operation) 
  Option to abandon (permanently 
abandon present operation) 
Learning options (limited 
investment to test the market)  
  Multiple interacting options (a 
collection of various options, 
both upward-potential enhancing 
and downward-protection) 
 
Volume options create choices for the scale of operation. Options to alter operating 
scale, and options to abandon (or exit options), belong to this category. Options to alter 
operating scale involve expanding, contracting, shutting down, or restarting production or 
operating facilities. This enables the firm to capitalize on growth opportunities, as well as to 
reduce the scale of operation, in response to changes in the demand and supply conditions. 
These are typically found in natural resource industries, such as mine operations, construction, 
as well as in cyclical industries like fashion apparel, consumer goods, and commercial real 
estates. Flexible automation is a technology that enables firms to create options to alter 
operating scale. Options to abandon are part of options to alter operating scale in the sense that 
they allow for shutting down of the operation. 
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Switching options create choices regarding combinations and sources of input and 
output. Options to switch, and flexibility options belong to this category. Option to switch inputs 
or outputs mix allows the firm to respond to the changes in demand/supply conditions as well as 
to reduce costs and to improve quality. A production facility that can switch among alternative 
energy inputs, relationships with a variety of parallel suppliers, or outsourcing of certain 
functions, are some examples of switching options. Researchers have also called this option as 
flexibility option (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999; Bowman & Hurry, 1993) or implementation option 
(Sanchez, 1993).  
We find that real options aim to minimize the following types of risks and uncertainties 
associated with investments in real assets: a) uncertainties of returns, b) uncertainties of 
volume, and c) uncertainties of cost and quality.  Uncertainties of returns arise due to 
unexpected depreciation of value and capital loss. At the same time there are opportunities for 
unexpected growth and capital appreciation. Uncertainties of volume arise because of 
unexpected and/or seasonal variations in the quantity of output. Demand may contract 
unexpectedly, or it may expand beyond expectations. Uncertainties of costs and qualities are 
related to inputs and output mix. There may be unexpected changes in the price of or 
combination of input-output. Firms need to be flexible in terms of supply of inputs and 
production of output (changes in quality or specifications). At the same time there are 
opportunities for reducing costs, improving quality, and develop new products.  
In the next section we discuss these types of risks in relation to human capital 
management.    
RISK AND HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
Several researchers have discussed human capital as a valuable strategic asset for the 
firm (Becker & Huselid, 1998; Becker, Huselid, Pickus, & Spratt, 1997; Pfeffer, 1994; Snell, 
Youndt & Wright, 1996; Wright, McMahan, & McWilliams, 1984). The knowledge, skills, and 
behaviors that are embodied in the employees of a firm constitute the ‘intellectual’ or ‘human’ 
capital of the firm. Hamel & Prahalad (1994) and Ulrich & Lake (1990) discuss how people are 
the main sources of ‘competencies’ and ‘capabilities’ of the firm, that leads to profitability. 
Following these scholars, we assert that the human capital of the firm are valuable (provide 
returns), require investments of time and money, carries the risk of loss of value as well as the 
opportunity of appreciation of value, and thereby constitute a form of real asset for the firm. It is 
important to note that human capital, like real assets, provide current as well as future returns.  
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Types of Risks in Human Capital Management  
 Risk is uncertainty about outcomes or events, especially with respect to the future (Miller 
& Bromiley, 1990). Risk impairs forecasting and planning activities and makes it harder for 
decision-makers to plan future actions. A firm’s investments in its human capital involve risks 
because the performance of or the returns from human capital is uncertain and these may vary 
over time. Based on real options theory, we conceptualize the following types of risks and 
uncertainties associated with the management of human capital.  
Uncertainties of returns or performance. Uncertainties of returns or performance 
prevail because of skill obsolescence, demand for new skills, and turnover. As the competitive 
environment changes, firms must adapt by developing new technologies, products, and 
capabilities.  If current employees do not upgrade or adapt their skills and knowledge to the 
changed circumstances, it represents the risk of obsolescence of skills. Also, the new skills may 
not be readily available in the market or there may be high competition for these skills. For 
example, many companies have been caught unprepared for the demand for computer skills as 
more and more companies develop web-based business processes or e-commerce. This has 
resulted in an acute shortage of employees with the right skills for e-business. Similarly, in 
recent years there is an increasing thrust towards flexible automation systems for production. 
Introduction of these technologies requires a set of skills different from the assembly line mass 
production systems, which may not be present within the firm and may be difficult to acquire. 
Uncertainties of returns also exist because of possible turnover of employees, which represents 
capital loss. Due to the tight labor market and low unemployment in recent years in USA, many 
employers, especially small businesses, are finding it hard to retain their key employees. For 
example, two years ago BankOne announced that through its FirstUSA division it was going to 
create Wingspanbank.com, an internet bank which would achieve 1 million customers within its 
first 18 months of operation.  However, in its first year of operation, 5 of the original 7 top 
managers of the business had left, and the business itself had attracted only 100,000 
customers. 
Uncertainties of volume. Uncertainties of volume arise due to seasonal or cyclical 
trends in employment, or due to sudden fluctuations of demand and supply of the number of 
employees. For example the shipping industry typically experiences greater volume of work 
during the holiday season compared to rest of the year, which requires that companies employ 
a larger number of employees during this period. In summer, the hotel and resorts industry 
faces higher requirement for employees due to vacation seasons. Firms that face volume 
fluctuations in production demands have associated fluctuations in their human capital 
Recognizing Risk WP 00-20 
Page 10 
demands.  A high number of full time or permanent employees is a risk in case of such volatile 
demand.  (Note that this form of risk assumes a stable skill set and thus is distinct from risks 
associated with skill obsolescence, non-availability, or capital loss). For example, Boeing laid off 
12,000 employees in 1994 in an effort to put their staffing at a level consistent with the demand.  
However, within one year they received a record number of orders with guaranteed delivery 
dates. They faced a demand that far exceeded their ability to produce given the number of 
employees. Consequently, they failed to deliver on guaranteed orders and paid millions of 
dollars in compensatory fees to their customers. 
Uncertainties of costs and combinations. Uncertainties of costs are associated with 
the fixed cost of employees (i.e. cost escalation and/or need for cost reduction). High employee 
costs, especially when profitability is volatile, represent a severe drag on the cash flow of the 
firm. For example, over the past five years airlines have made record profits.  However, in 
negotiating contracts with their unionized workforce, these firms have strongly resisted sharing 
these profits via wage increases.  This stems from a concern with creating a high fixed cost 
wage structure in the face of a future economic (and thus, industry) downturn. 
Uncertainties of combination arise when there is a need for reallocation of employees or 
their skills within the firm due to qualitative/quantitative variations in demand and supply. For 
example day to day scheduling may require shifting of employees around different operations as 
per requirement. This may also be necessary for reducing employee costs or for keeping it 
under control. If employees do not have the breadth of skills or knowledge, this may not be 
possible, and gives rise to the risk of combination.  
This list of specific risks is by no means exhaustive.  To examine every specific risk 
associated with managing human capital is beyond the scope of any one paper. We argue that 
risks involved in human capital management are similar to risks involved in real assets 
management where it may take the form of uncertainties of returns, uncertainties of volume, and 
uncertainties of cost and combination. We suggest that HR practices form the basis for options 
contracts for managing these forms of risk associated with human capital assets. 
HR Practices as Real Options 
HR practices are mechanisms through which the human capital of the firm are acquired, 
maintained, and motivated. Thus through HR practices, the firm invests in its human capital and 
manages them. We argue that certain HR practices act as ‘options’ on human capital, which 
minimize risks and maximize opportunities in human capital management.    
We have several reasons to consider HR practices as ‘HR options’ that are similar to 
real options. First, just as real options are based on real assets, tangible or intangible, HR 
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practices as options, are generated for managing human resources, which is a real asset with 
intangible components. Second, the value of the real assets underlying the real options 
fluctuates over time. The value of employee competencies are also not static, they vary over 
time either upwards or downwards or both (i.e. some skills may become more important while 
others may become redundant or less important).  Third, like real options, HR practices are 
semi-contracts in the sense that they generate rights on the part of both the firm and the 
employees, the underlying assets being employee knowledge, skills, and behaviors that are 
valuable to the firm.  Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni (1994) discuss HR practices as ‘psychological’ 
contracts that refer to beliefs that individuals hold regarding promises made, accepted, and 
relied upon between employees and the firm.  In a sense, many HR practices act as 
investments in human capital, and represent, to some extent, bets on the value of that human 
capital at a future date.  
Fourth, real options create alternative decision choices for decision-making in real asset 
investments. For example the firm may have the option to continue investment, abandon 
investment, or switch from one type of investment to another. HR practices also generate 
alternative choices for the firm in the management of their human capital. For example for skill 
acquisition the choice is between recruiting or contracting out. The recruitment and selection 
function also have the choices of recruiting for specialized or generalized skills, undertaking a 
wide or narrow search, and internal vs. external selection. The training function entails the 
choice of behavior or skill training, broad-based or specialized skill training, in-house, on-the-job 
or external training. The compensation management function offers the choice of the extent of 
fixed vs. variable pay, the degree of variability of pay as linked to various output parameters.  All 
of these decision choices entail different types and levels of risk with regard to the value of the 
resulting human asset.  Thus we see HR practices as real options acting on human capital and 
providing alternative decision choices for the firm. Table 2 provides a comparative analysis of 
financial options, real options and HR options. 
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Table 2: A Facet Analysis of Financial, Real, and HR Options  
 
 
 
Dimension Financial Options Real Options HR Options 
Options 
written on 
Financial securities e.g. stocks, currency, 
commodities 
Real assets, tangible or intangible e.g. 
projects, products, technology, new 
venture 
Knowledge, skills & behaviors of employees, 
volume of employees, cost of employees   
Value of 
underlying 
asset 
Underlying security has value Underlying asset has value Employees add value through application of their 
knowledge, skills and behaviors 
Variability of 
asset value 
Price of security varies over time Value of assets varies over time Applicability of knowledge, skills and behaviors 
vary over time 
Function of 
options 
Risk management tool, future scope for 
investment 
Risk management tool, future scope for 
investment 
Risk management tool, future adaptability and 
switching 
Purpose of 
options 
Speculative instrument on future prices Speculative investments on future courses 
of actions 
Investment for future skills & behaviors, 
variability of volume and costs 
Instruments 
used 
Calls, puts Project partnering, patents, joint ventures 
etc.  
Combinations of HR practices  
Rights under 
the contract 
Right to buy or sell securities at a set price 
on a future date 
Right to develop, abandon, or switch 
projects  
Scope to modify practices according to future 
requirements  
Premium or 
current 
investment 
Premium to be paid at the time of the 
contract  
Partial investment in the current period May entail extra cost in the current period 
Utility of 
options 
Allow the investor to cover risks and benefit 
from volatile prices with far less investment 
Allow firms to buffer against greater loss of 
value with lower sunk cost  
Allow firms to buffer against future obsolescence 
of knowledge and skills and helps develop 
appropriate behaviors for changed 
circumstances  
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HR Options and Risk in Human Capital Management 
 Recent work in SHRM has found that certain ‘high performance work systems’ (HPWS) 
comprising of HR practices like selective recruitment, contingent employees, training, 
performance appraisal, performance-based incentive compensations, voice and participative 
mechanisms, contribute significantly to the profitability of the firm (Arthur, 1994; Delery & Doty, 
1996; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995). But, as Becker et al. (1997) point out, to date there is 
not much evidence as to how such systems create value i.e. the process through which HPWS 
influence the human capital of the firm that ultimately leads to profitability. We suggest that 
some these HR practices and their variations create ‘options’ for the firm, which minimize the 
risk of loss of human capital value and maximize choices to capture future opportunities, all of 
which contribute positively to firm profitability. 
 In discussing how these HR practices may act as HR options for the firm, we find that it 
is necessary to analyze the qualitative variations of these practices. For example, selectivity in 
recruitment may be selective towards specialized skills (professional certifications, specialized 
education etc.) or for broad-based, generalized skills (persons with high general ability scores). 
Similarly, training may enhance specialized skills (vertical training) or may develop broad-based 
skills (horizontal training). It is necessary to make such qualitative distinction for the purpose of 
analyzing the role of HR practices under the options framework. 
 Most SHRM researchers have taken a ‘index’ approach to HPWS, focusing on the extent 
to which a broadly defined set of practices is used across all employees of a firm. As Lepak & 
Snell (1999) points out, a more fine-grained perspective in the form of different variations of 
practices for different groups of employees may yield a richer understanding of human capital 
management. Accordingly, we consider qualitative variations of HR practices that manage 
various kinds of risks associated with human capital investment (see Fig 1).  
HR options for managing uncertainties of returns. Uncertainties of returns of human 
capital arise from skill obsolescence, demand for new skills, and capital loss. We discuss HR 
options for each of these three factors separately. 
Training for new or future skills are HR options for managing skill obsolescence. 
Research on training, till date, has mostly looked at the relationship between presence of formal 
training and firm performance, with positive findings (Bartel, 1994). We discuss training in terms 
of the type of training imparted. Management of risks related to skill obsolescence demands that 
the firm develop a broad inventory of skills so that there is continual supply of new or different 
skills. Training imparting new skills or modified skills that may be required in the future is 
suitable for managing this type of risk. Risks of skill obsolescence vary according to the type of 
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skill. For example, driving skills do not become obsolete as fast as computer skills. We argue 
that the content of training program is related to the degree of risk of skill obsolescence. Firms 
requiring skills that could become obsolete fast, would have more training programs geared 
towards new or upgraded skills. These types of training represent ‘growth’ HR options which 
gives the firm choices for growing through new or upgraded skills, thereby minimizing the risks 
of skill obsolescence.   
Another way firms can generate growth options for their human capital management is 
through recruitment. Selectivity in recruitment refers to setting higher standards for choosing the 
employee to hire. Selectivity may be manifested in several ways, by requiring college or 
professional degree, by administering selection tests and so on. If selectivity is for broad-based 
skills rather than specialized skills (as tested through general ability tests etc.), then growth 
options are created because such employees are trainable and can upgrade their skills easily. 
Thus we propose that training for new or upgraded skills, and selectivity in recruitment for 
broad-based skills represent HR ‘growth’ options to minimize risk of skill obsolescence, and 
maximize future growth opportunities through generation of new skills. 
Another HR practice that acts to ensure updated and market-specific skills of is the skill 
based compensation plan. As Murray & Gerhart (1998) point out, “By paying for attributes 
(knowledge, skills, and abilities) of individuals, organizations hope to direct the attention of their 
employees to developmental opportunities and to encourage skill-seeking behavior” (pp. 68). 
Snell & Dean (1994) suggest that person contingent skill-based pay rewards continuous 
learning and derives value from increased flexibility in a dynamic environment. Researchers 
have found positive linkages between skill-based pay and firm performance (MacDuffuie, 1995; 
Murray & Gerhart, 1998). Skill based pay creates opportunities for developing multiple and 
broad-based skills, manage risks of skill obsolescence and generate options because 
employees are rewarded for learning new skills and developing a broad array of talents (Lawler 
& Ledford, 1985).  
Thus, we propose that, 
Proposition 1: Firms that have greater risks of skill obsolescence and greater demands 
for new skills would create greater number of growth HR options in the form of training for new 
or upgraded skills, selectivity in recruitment for broad-based skills, and skill based compensation 
plans.  
A major difference between human assets and other forms of real assets is that the firm 
never ‘possess’ human assets in the true sense. Employees may leave the organization at their 
will, thereby taking critical skills with them. Voluntary turnover is increasingly becoming a major 
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risk for organizations, especially in the higher management and critical skill category where 
demand exceeds supply. Research on voluntary turnover have identified overall job 
dissatisfaction arising from dissatisfaction with pay/promotion/supervisory relations, as well as 
dissatisfaction with job content like autonomy, responsibility etc. as organizational factors that 
contribute to greater turnover (Griffeth & Hom, 1995). 
Risks of capital loss i.e. turnover of employees are managed through various HR 
practices like highly competitive pay, employee stock options, participation programs, voice 
mechanisms, and attractive benefits packages. Firms pay highly competitive salaries in order to 
attract and retain the skills they need. The higher the value of the skills, the higher is the 
competitiveness in pay. In this sense, the firms pay a ‘premium’ for the skills that are more 
critical for the firm. For example, currently, IT skills are fetching high premium in the job market. 
Employee stock options are a form of deferred pay. Employees are given options for buying 
stock of the company on a later date at a price below the expected market price. This is an 
incentive to the employee to stay with the company (the stock options may not be exercisable if 
they leave the company). Programs that allow for employee participation in decision-making 
(participative committees, quality circles etc.), voice mechanisms (grievance procedure, 
suggestion schemes), and attractive benefits packages (401K plans for retirement with high 
employer contribution, health insurance, life insurance, disability insurance, cafeteria plans for 
dependant care and medical expenses, health club memberships, child care assistance, tuition-
remittance for self or dependants etc.) are all various HR practices for attracting employees and 
motivating them to stay with the company. There is ample evidence that these practices 
improve employee morale and satisfaction with their job. For example Peterson & Tracy (1992) 
found that employee involvement in joint problem-solving committees in unionized setup 
significantly reduced employee grievances, and improved overall company performance. Wager 
(1997) found support that positive labor-management relationship in the form of prompt 
settlement of grievances, perceived fairness in employment conditions on the part of 
employees, joint problem solving by union and management, management seeking input from 
the union before initiating changes, and the practice of free exchange of information, have 
positive effect on perceived performance. Shaw, Delery, & Gupta (1998) show that greater 
benefits and procedural justice significantly reduce quit rate of employees.   
These HR options are exclusive to human capital management. We call them HR 
options to manage employee turnover. We hypothesize that firms that face greater risks of 
employee turnover would use these HR options to mange these risk.  
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Proposition 2: Firms that have greater risks of employee turnover would create greater 
number of HR options to manage turnover through practices like highly competitive pay, 
employee stock options, participation programs, voice mechanisms, attractive benefits etc.   
HR options for managing uncertainties of volume. Uncertainties of volume arise 
because of fluctuating demands in terms of numbers. Contingent labor, part time, contractual 
employees are HR options that allow the firm to ‘alter operating scale’ i.e. vary the total number 
of employees, according to the fluctuations in demand.  Purcell (1998) discusses how use of 
contingent labor is increasingly becoming associated with high performance HRM.  For example 
retail outlets hire temporary employees during the holiday season, many companies implement 
projects through external consultants, hospitals fill a number of positions through part time or 
temporary employees, schools hire temporary employees for substituting. Contingent labor, part 
time employees, contractual employees may also be considered as timing options in relation to 
acquisition of human skills for which uncertainties of future demand exist. Timing options 
manage uncertainties of volume by ‘deferring’ or ‘staging’ the investment. Through these 
options the firm has the choice not to commit itself fully in the current period in acquiring these 
skills. The firm ‘leases’ the human capital in the form of contractual/temporary employees or it 
may ‘stage’ investment in the form of part time employees. For example, CNA Insurance 
company manages most of their major IT projects through outside contractors because of the 
uncertainty of continuation of demand. At the same time these practices allow the firm to invest 
in  ‘growth’ options by leasing the skills that may become critical skills in the future. The firm has 
the choice in the future to internalize these jobs, depending on actual demand conditions. The 
option to ‘abandon’ i.e. the choice to give up the investment in order to minimize losses, is 
inherent in these HR practices. For example the CNA Insurance company recently closed down 
its Detroit IT center, terminating most of the IT contractual employees.  
Thus, we postulate that firms that face greater fluctuations of volume would employ 
greater number of contingent/part time/contractual employees. 
Proposition 3: Firms that have greater uncertainties of volume would create greater 
number of HR options to alter operating scales, HR timing options, and HR growth options  in 
the form of contingent labor, part time employees, contractual labor etc. 
HR options for managing uncertainties of cost and combination. Uncertainties 
related to cost exist when there are greater fluctuations in firm performance but the costs are 
relatively fixed. Firms vary with respect to their performance, the ‘blue-chip’ firms have stable 
performance over the years, while small and highly leveraged firms may have greater 
fluctuations in performance. If fixed costs are very high then a firm with fluctuating performance 
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has the risk of losses in case of downturns in revenues. Employee costs constitute a major 
portion of overall costs of the firm. If employee costs are mostly fixed, then it is a big drag on the 
firm’s cash flow, especially in case of fluctuating performance (as seen in the semiconductor 
industry). In such cases these firms would create options to manage employee costs.  
The options to manage employee costs are found in variable compensation plans. 
Gerhart & Milkovich (1990) noted that organizational and unit level incentive plans cause labor 
cost to be more variable than fixed. Wide use of highly variable compensation plans is found in 
the sales profession, where has under high uncertainty of performance, sales agents are paid 
on full commission basis (e.g. jewelry sales), while under less uncertain conditions, commission 
is added to base pay (e.g. financial services sales).   
 Apart from the extent of variable pay in the total compensation package, variable 
compensation plans also entail decisions regarding the choice of parameters for measurement 
of performance, extent of variability of these parameters, and the level of measurement of these 
parameters. Variable compensation plans that are based on performance, can range from 
individual bonus plans and individual merit pay plans to plans based on group/unit/firm 
performance such as profit sharing and gain sharing. Studies of the performance impact of 
individual level plans have shown mixed results (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). Studies on firm 
level profit sharing and gain sharing plans, however, have generally shown positive impacts on 
performance (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Schuster, 1986). We argue that performance based 
variable plans that are designed at the firm or unit level generate options to ‘switch’. Firm or unit 
level variable compensation plans better align employees interest with that of the firm, leading to 
greater transparency, commitment and adaptability on the part of the employees. This creates 
the opportunity that employees would accept variations in their pay according to variations in 
firm performance.    
 Thus we propose that, 
 Proposition 4: Firms that have greater uncertainties of cost would create greater number 
of HR options to alter costs and HR options to switch costs in the form of variable pay and 
performance based incentive plans at the firm or unit level. 
Uncertainties of combination arise when there is a need for reallocation of skills within 
the firm due to variations in demand/supply. HR practices that may act as options to manage 
uncertainties of combination are job rotation, and team based work. Many companies formally 
or informally rotate employees among different kinds of jobs in order to develop the flexibility of 
skills as well as to retain the culture of shifting responsibilities, so that when the need arises, 
employees may be easily reallocated. Under team based work, temporary teams are formed for 
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particular projects or jobs. Thus there is a continuous shifting of employees, that helps the firm 
maintain its flexibility, and mange costs. In essence these HR practices represent ‘switching’ 
options. Accordingly we propose that. 
     Proposition 5: Firms that have greater uncertainties of combination would create 
greater number of switching options in the form of job rotation and team-based work. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The field of Strategic HRM has long struggled with determining the ways in which HR 
practices can create value for firms.  While the recent focus on high performance HR practices 
has yielded promising empirical data to support a relationship between these practices and firm 
performance (Becker & Huselid, 1998), little is still known about the specific ways in which this 
value is created (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Delery, 1998; Wright & Sherman, 1999).  Even the 
hypothesized mechanisms of lower operating costs and creation of inimitable human assets 
(Becker & Huselid, 1998; Wright, McMahan, & McWilliams, 1994) are based in rather static and 
cross sectional assumptions about the competitive environment.  In addition, the focus on high 
performance employment practices only narrowly addresses all of the levers that HR can use to 
manage a firm’s workforce. 
A real options approach to Strategic HRM addresses these issues. First, it provides 
another theoretical rationale for how HRM can create value for a firm through its emphasis on 
minimizing risks and expanding a firm’s ability to capitalize on opportunities.  Second, it provides 
a more dynamic component to decision making through viewing HR investments as potentially 
changing in value over time.  Finally, it undertakes a more fine-grained analysis of HR practices 
to study qualitative variations of these practices that firms use to manage their human capital 
pool.  Thus, the real options framework provides a valuable contribution to understanding the 
issues inherent in and the role that HR plays in creating value through human capital for firms in 
dynamic environments. 
We use the real options framework to analyze the different types of risks associated with 
human capital management, and the HR practices that may act as options to minimize these 
risks. In doing so we provide a new direction of research in strategic human resource 
management, one that acknowledges that investments in human capital are similar to 
investments in other types of real assets, and thus carry risks. Our purpose is to provide a 
framework for analyzing these risks and the role of different HR practices that may mitigate 
these risks. 
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Limitations 
In extending the real options framework to the field of Strategic HRM, specifically 
focusing on the management of human capital, some caveats are in order.  First, there is one 
fundamental difference between human capital and other physical forms of real assets, that is, 
firms never fully possess human capital, it basically resides in people and is lost when people 
leave the organization. This is true for most of the invisible assets like reputation, product 
image, learning, knowledge – the ownership of the asset is never under full control of the firm, it 
depends more on other players in the field e.g. employees, customers etc.  This was recognized 
as a specific form of risk in an earlier section. It is important to note that this only increases the 
risk associated with investments in human capital, thus, again pointing to the relevance of an 
options theory framework for examining such investments.     
 Second, extending real options thinking to human capital relies on the assumption that 
human capital has value, and that the value changes over time.  Currently, the valuation of 
human capital is at best problematic, and at worst, impossible.  However, as noted previously, 
the valuation of real options is less important than for financial options.  More important is the 
underlying logic for strategic decision making.  Thus, while an ability to place an exact value on 
all forms of human capital would be quite useful in the application of real options thinking to 
Strategic HRM, it is by no means necessary.  Rather, the underlying logic of real options 
provides an extension of how researchers and practitioners can approach the management of 
human capital. 
 Third, a criticism against the application of real option theory to SHRM may be that this 
framework suggests greater outsourcing of HR functions and less commitment towards 
employees.  We disagree for two reasons.  First, it is increasingly recognized that in order to be 
maximally effective, HRM has to deal more with ‘strategic’ functions and less with routine 
functions, which may be easily outsourced (Becker & Huselid, 1998). The real options logic 
further strengthens this contention, while providing a framework for engaging in this strategic 
role. 
Second, creation of options does not entail reduced commitment towards employees; 
rather, it calls for stabilizing the employment relationships across a variety of strategic and 
economic scenarios.  Risk in returns in investments in human capital cannot be ignored, and to 
do so would result in greater, rather than less variability in relationships with employees over 
time. Options to switch generate the capability for managing changes incrementally, rather than 
drastically through layoffs etc., by incorporating different choices in the HRM process. Options 
to defer and staged investment options specifically act towards not getting into a situation when 
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a firm is forced to retrench employees that are no longer required. It may be contended that HR 
options actually increase a firm’s commitment towards its existing employees because the firm 
is generating alternative choices for managing their employees. It may be said that 
organizations using such HR options enhance employee-organization fit rather than employee-
job fit so that when the job changes, the employee still remains valuable to the firm (Tsui et al., 
1995).  
 Fourth, by no means we want to imply that the use of HR options is suitable for all 
organizations. The extent of use of HR options and their usefulness will depend upon the extent 
of risks associated with the human capital of the firm. Firms facing greater risks may use greater 
number of options. For example in a high velocity industry, like the IT industry, these HR options 
are being used extensively, while they may not be so common in relatively stable industries 
where HR risks are low. Again, different types of HR options may be used in different industries 
according to the type of risk present. For example, the risk of volume fluctuations may be more 
in the trucking industry, while risk of skill fluctuations may be low. 
 Finally, one could argue that the basic linkages we propose between HR practices and 
environmental conditions or performance outcomes are certainly not new to the strategic HRM 
literature.  However, we note that past explications of these relationships have usually focused 
purely on cost or revenue considerations as noted previously. An increasingly dynamic 
environment results in corresponding increases in risk for any investment in human capital.  For 
the field of HRM to ignore such risk would result in far less than optimal strategic decision 
making. 
Future Directions 
 We believe that the emphasis on risks in human capital management raises a number of 
issues that need further investigation. First, this theoretical framework sets the stage for 
empirically investigating the relationship between different types of risks associated with human 
capital management, and presence of HR options. It would also be one of the first empirical 
analysis of the real options theory. Second, We believe that HR options would have synergistic 
effects when they act in a ’bundle’ as multiple interacting options. Research is needed to 
analyze the different ‘bundles’ of HR options based on the purpose they serve together. For 
example the synergistic effect selectivity of recruitment for broad-based skills, training for broad-
based skills, and skill based pay taken together may be more effective in reducing uncertainty of 
return, rather than each of them individually. 
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Figure 1: HR options and Risk in Human Capital Management 
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